Messenger services, new removal claim, and new criminal offenses: the government bill to combat digital violence
21 October 2026
On 7 October 2026, the Federal Cabinet adopted the government bill of an act to combat digital violence ("GgdG-E"). It retains the basic framework of the draft bill published by the Federal Ministry of Justice in April (link to our post of 24 April 2026). In two key respects, however, the government bill goes further: first, it brings certain messenger services within the scope of the statutory provisions; second, it creates a stand-alone claim by the affected individual against the service provider for the removal of illegal content. In addition, the draft contains new criminal offenses, including on the protection of privacy rights of affected individuals in cases of identity misuse. The Bundestag and the Bundesrat must still debate and adopt the bill.
New addressees: messengers with group communication
The ministerial draft had expressly excluded pure communication services, such as messengers and e-mail services, from its scope. Under the GgdG-E, however, providers of number-independent interpersonal communications services (Sec. 3 no. 40 of the Telecommunications Act, TKG) are now included, provided that their service "enables communication in groups" (Sec. 1(2) no. 4 GgdG-E). This refers to "group chats," which are already mentioned in the recitals of the European Electronic Communications Code (Directive (EU) 2018/1972). The explanatory memorandum supplements an abstract description of these services (a virtual communication space for multiple users) with specific examples (WhatsApp, Signal, Telegram, iMessage, the Facebook and Instagram messengers, and Threema).
The draft seeks to limit this extension of the scope to closed communication spaces by providing that an infringement requires that the act was committed in a group which, at the time of the act's commission, is so large that the individual user can no longer control further dissemination of the content (Sec. 1(3) GgdG-E). It is questionable whether or to what extent this will limit the scope of application in practice. The explanatory memorandum refers to case law on the criminal-law concept of dissemination, which is, under certain circumstances, already met when content is passed on to a single person. Here, despite the indicators mentioned in the explanatory memorandum (e.g., dynamic group structure, significant number of members, purpose of the group, forwarding and access options), complex issues regarding the burden of presentation and proof are also to be expected.
Providers of messenger services may, therefore, also be obliged to disclose data (Sec. 2 GgdG-E), preserve evidence (Sec. 3 GgdG-E) and grant user rights (Sec. 6 GgdG-E). Whether this also applies to the claims for account suspension and removal (Sec. 4 GgdG-E) cannot yet be conclusively assessed, given the broad definition of social networks that is modeled after the Digital Services Act ("DSA") (Sec. 1(5) GgdG-E).
New removal claim
The ministerial draft addressed the removal of illegal content only as an "ancillary consequence" of the account suspension, without awarding an independent removal claim to the affected individual. The government bill now codifies such a removal claim against the service provider, which the explanatory memorandum – questionably from a doctrinal perspective – classifies as a civil-law cease-and-desist claim. This "independent" claim exists in addition to claims under Sec. 1004 of the German Civil Code (BGB) by analogy in conjunction with Sec. 823 BGB against perpetrators and/or service providers.
The substantive threshold for the removal claim is lower than for the suspension claim, as no serious violation of privacy is required; the requirement of a judicial order nevertheless applies. Service providers remain free to remove content on a contractual basis or under the notice and action mechanism pursuant to Art. 16 DSA.
Criminal law changes
The ministerial draft already provided for new criminal offenses regarding violation of privacy by taking images (Sec. 184k StGB-E), violation of privacy rights through deceptive content (Sec. 201b StGB-E), and unauthorized surveillance of affected individuals by means of information technology (Sec. 202e StGB-E). In addition, the government bill, with the new Sec. 201c StGB-E, criminalizes making offensive content accessible under the identity of another person. Sec. 184k StGB-E has been revised and limited to deliberate or knowing violations of privacy. In return, fully computer-generated – not merely altered – image content that gives the impression of, among other things, sexual acts is now also covered by the offense. The "likely" occurrence of serious harm required by the ministerial draft for unauthorized surveillance under Sec. 202e StGB-E is replaced in the government bill by the lower threshold of the surveillance being capable of causing considerable harm to the affected individuals.
As already provided for in the ministerial draft, the GgdG-E contains its own administrative fine provision for cases in which social networks, in breach of Sec. 9(1) GgdG-E, fail to appoint a domestic authorized recipient for service (Sec. 10 GgdG-E). The possible fine against legal persons amounts to up to EUR 5 million.
Outlook
The government bill not only leaves open the fundamental issue of friction between national suspension obligations and the DSA requirements for service providers (link to our post of 24 April 2026) but further exacerbates it through the independent removal claim. The Federal Government has notified the draft to the European Commission. The comments of the EU institutions and the Member States, which may be submitted until early 2027, are likely – rightly, as is currently the case in many areas of national digital regulation – to scrutinize the relationship with the DSA in particular.
